Nova Law Review
Volume 41, Issue 3

2017

Article 6

Patient Safety Should Include Patient Privacy:
The Shortcomings Of The FDA’s Recent Draft
Guidance Regarding Cybersecurity Of
Medical Devices
Christopher Kersbergen∗

∗

Copyright c 2017 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Patient Safety Should Include Patient Privacy:
The Shortcomings Of The FDA’s Recent Draft
Guidance Regarding Cybersecurity Of
Medical Devices
Christopher Kersbergen

Abstract
Right now, a healthcare provider somewhere in the United States is being hacked or suffering
the repercussions of a successful hack. Those healthcare providers that have not been attacked
successfully likely have an individual attempting to penetrate the healthcare provider’s network.
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INTRODUCTION

Right now, a healthcare provider somewhere in the United States is
being hacked or suffering the repercussions of a successful hack. Those
healthcare providers that have not been attacked successfully likely have an
individual attempting to penetrate the healthcare provider’s network. The
attacker is targeting the weakest link in the healthcare provider’s network, a
connected medical device. The device is a wireless infusion pump that is
present in nearly every hospital room and contains a host of cybersecurity
vulnerabilities. A successful attack would allow the individual to change the
dose of medicine the pump provides and potentially seriously injure or kill
the patient, but the attacker only wishes to use the infusion pump to pivot
*.
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into the hospital’s network. Once in the network, the attacker can access
every device in the hospital and every patient’s health record. The attacker
then holds the hospital hostage by launching a ransomware attack.1 The
hospital is crippled by the attack and cannot access vital patient records,
nurses’ stations, test results, and monitoring equipment. The attacker holds
the hospital hostage for a sum of money, which the hospital is forced to pay.
The attack is over, but the repercussions to the hospital and the patients
impacted last a lifetime. The hospital is fined millions of dollars for the loss
of protected patient health information. The stolen patient information is
sold and used.
A victim of the attack is denied a surgery by his or her health
insurance carrier because a person used his or her stolen health information
to have surgery a continent away. Another victim is billed for healthcare
someone else received. Yet another person has private and embarrassing
health information posted on the internet. All of the victims suffer in one
form or another, many not realizing they have been a victim until it is too
late. The frightening realization is that everyone, at one point, has been the
victim of a cyberattack on a healthcare provider. The healthcare industry has
become virtually dependent on medical devices, and individuals motivated
by the enormous profits achievable by attacking medical devices are causing
severe concerns for all stakeholders in the healthcare industry.2
The regulatory agencies that are responsible for protecting healthcare
critical infrastructure from cybersecurity threats have been slow and reactive
to the danger. Only within the last couple of years have they made
cybersecurity a top priority.3 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is
the government agency “responsible for . . . [ensuring] that medical devices
are [both] safe and effective for use.”4 The FDA exercises its regulatory
authority with regard to cybersecurity of medical devices in the form of
1.
Alert: Ransomware and Recent Variants, US-CERT (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A. “Ransomware is a type of malware that
infects computer systems, restricting user[] access to the . . . system[] . . . [until] a ransom is
paid . . . .” Id.
2.
TRAPX LABS, TRAPX SEC., INC., ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK: MEDJACK
(MEDICAL DEVICE HIJACK) 7–8 (2015).
3.
See Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, ICS-CERT (June 13,
2013), http://www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-13-164-01; Billy Rios, Hospira
Plum A+ Infusion Pump Vulnerabilities, BILLY (BK) RIOS (June 8, 2015), http://www.xssniper.com/blog/2015/06/08/hospira-plum-a-infusion-pump-vulnerabilities.
4.
Laura Hagen, Coding for Health: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices,
HEALTH LAW., June 2016, at 25, 25–26; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 351, 360c(f), 360e(a) (2012);
21 C.F.R. § 806.1 (2016).
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guidance documents issuing alerts about medical devices and product
recalls.5 In May of 2015, the FDA issued one such alert regarding a
vulnerability identified with an infusion system that could allow an
unauthorized user to control the device and change the dosage the pump
delivers.6 The alert came ten days after the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) issued warnings on the very same pump.7 It was the first
time the FDA advised healthcare providers to discontinue use of a medical
device because of cybersecurity concerns.8
Both agencies and the
manufacturer were aware of the vulnerability for over a year before the
advisory was issued.9 This prompted the increased focus by the FDA and
other government agencies on the cybersecurity of medical devices.10 The
increased focus led to the FDA issuing guidance documents for the industry,
titled Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices.11
The FDA has largely been reactionary to cybersecurity threats but
appears to be moving towards a proactive approach to ensure the safety of
medical devices.12 The guidance documents are a step in the right direction
because of their risk-based approach to cybersecurity.13 The guidance does
have flaws, as it falls short on the issue of patient privacy protection, which
is neither discussed nor mentioned.14 The regulatory function of the FDA is
5.
Hagen, supra note 4, at 25–26; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira
Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 31,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm456815.htm;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(May
13,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm446809.htm.
6.
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump
Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
7.
See id. The FDA published a safety communication for Hospira’s PCA 3
LifeCare, PCA 5 LifeCare, and Symbiq lines of products. Id. ICS-CERT published an
advisory for Hospira’s Plum A+, Plum A+3, and Symbiq lines of products. Advisory:
Hospira Plum A+ and Symbiq Infusion Systems Vulnerabilities, ICS-CERT (June 10, 2015),
http://www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-161-01; Advisory: Hospira Symbiq
Infusion System Vulnerability, ICS-CERT (July 21, 2015), http://www.ics-cert.uscert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-174-01.
8.
See Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump
Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
9.
See RIOS, supra note 3.
10.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2015 22 (2015), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/reports-andpublications/archives/workplan/2015/FY15-Work-Plan.pdf.
11.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2016).
12.
See id.
13.
See id.
14.
See id.
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focused primarily on the safety of the devices it regulates, not privacy, and
because of that focus, manufacturers are free to ignore many of the issues
that are causing the cybersecurity crisis of medical devices.15
This Article restricts the scope of the discussion of the FDA
guidance documents to three key recommendations newly introduced, rather
than a review of their contents.16 The newly introduced recommendations
include the introduction for the manufacturer defined essential clinical
performance of a medical device, the distinction between controlled and
uncontrolled risks, and promotion of membership in Information Sharing and
Analysis Organization (“ISAO”) for manufacturers.17 Additionally, the
guidance documents focus on medical devices that are already in the market
and deployed in healthcare organizations.18 Therefore, cybersecurity issues
related to premarket considerations of a device are outside the scope of this
Article. First, this Article addresses why medical devices have become such
an attractive target for attackers and the cybersecurity challenges facing
manufacturers.19 The cybersecurity challenges that are discussed include
hard-coded passwords, old and outdated equipment, and the inability for
devices to detect or scan for malware infections.20 Next, this Article focuses
on the newly introduced definitions and recommendations found in the
guidance documents.21 Finally, this Article points out key shortcomings of
the guidance documents, including: the lack of attention to patient privacy
due to language that could potentially allow manufacturers to leave known
vulnerabilities that do not affect the safety of the device unaddressed, the
vague and problematic description of ISAO, and the lack of enforceable rules
in the guidance.22
II.

CHALLENGES SECURING MEDICAL DEVICES

The use of medical devices that are connected to computer networks
has proliferated, as have attacks on medical devices.23 Medical devices are
now part of the Internet of things, and are exposed to the same cybersecurity

15.
Id. The Office of the Inspector General is currently examining whether
FDA oversight of networked medical devices is sufficient to effectively protect patient health
information. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 50.
16.
See infra Parts II–IV.
17.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
18.
Id.
19.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part II.
20.
See infra Sections II.A–C.
21.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part III.
22.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; infra Part IV.
23.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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threats to which anything connected to the Internet is exposed.24 While
networked medical devices facilitate care, they also introduce a host of new
cybersecurity risks for patients and for the hospitals that are using the
devices.25
Criminals can gain access to devices that contain little or no
cybersecurity protection, and, once breached, they are able to access any
personal or medical information that is stored on the device or potentially
control the device itself.26
Healthcare is increasingly targeted by
cybercriminals for a relatively simple reason: Crime pays.27 Patient health
information is worth substantially more money on the black market than is
credit card information.28 Credit card information can be sold for one or two
dollars; patient health information, though, can go for as high as forty dollars
per record.29 That information can be used to commit insurance fraud,
identity theft for financial gain, or a specific targeted attack against an
individual.30 For example, an attacker can take information obtained from
patient health information to disclose embarrassing or private and sensitive
information to the victim’s friends and family.31 In terms of safety, they
could possibly change the coding of a medical device—controlling anything
from the amount of medicine that is dispensed, to even changing health data
collected by a device.32 A doctor could conceivably make wrong decisions
based on altered information obtained from a medical device.33
Multiple government agencies have been focusing on the
cybersecurity of medical devices in recent years.34 Among them, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) investigated healthcare as a high profile risk,
releasing a private industry notification, FBI Case No. 140408-009, stating
there will be a likely increase in cyber intrusions due to lax cybersecurity
24.
Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime, FBI: INTERNET
CRIME COMPLAINT CTR. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.ic3.gov/media/2015/150910.aspx.
25.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Internet of Things Poses
Opportunities for Cyber Crime, supra note 24.
26.
Internet of Things Poses Opportunities for Cyber Crime, supra note 24;
see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
27.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 7–8.
28.
See id. at 8.
29.
Id.; Elizabeth Clarke, Hackers Sell Health Insurance Credentials, Bank
Accounts, SSNs and Counterfeit Documents, SECUREWORKS: CTU RESEARCH (July 15, 2013),
http://www.secureworks.com/blog/general-hackers-sell-health-insurance-credentials-bankaccounts-ssns-and-counterfeit-documents.
30.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HACKING HEALTHCARE IT IN
2016: LESSONS THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY CAN LEARN FROM THE OPM BREACH 4, 25 (2016).
31.
See id. at 3–4, 11, 16.
32.
Id. at 48; see also Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
33.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 48.
34.
Id. at 2; Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
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standards.35 Clearly, the main factor driving cyberattacks on connected
medical devices is that successful attacks lead to enormous profits.36
Compounding the problem are reports that the healthcare industry is not
prepared to combat even the most basic of cyberattacks.37 Healthcare
organizations and the medical devices they use are low hanging fruit because
there are no regulations that require a medical device to meet minimum
cybersecurity standards before going to the market.38 Over two-thirds of
healthcare provider organizations have experienced a cyberattack in one
form or another over the last few years, with the number of attacks possibly
being much higher.39
Numerous other factors contribute to the explosion of attempts to
attack medical devices, but one of the largest contributors is healthcare
organizations converting to electronic health records.40 It is frightening to
consider that medical devices often run the same standard operating systems
as copy machines and printers, and connect to the Internet in similar or the
same way as laptops and smartphones connect through Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.41
Unlike many personal devices, medical devices often do not receive updates
to protect security, nor are they protected from outside intrusions.42 Many
have hard-coded passwords that can be looked up by anyone with knowledge
of the device.43 A medical device that provides the best example of just how
difficult of a challenge securing medical devices can be is an infusion
pump.44 Infusion pumps are generally networked in nearly every hospital

35.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions
for
Financial
Gain,
FBI
CYBER
DIV.
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140408--fbipin-healthsyscyberintrud.pdf.
36.
Id.; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at
11.
37.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions for Financial Gain, supra note 35.
38.
See J.M. Porup, Why Aren’t There Better Cybersecurity Regulations for
Medical
Devices?,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD
(Oct.
19,
2015,
7:00
AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-arent-there-better-cybersecurity-regulations-formedical-devices.
39.
Alex Ruoff, Health-Care Industry Spending More on Security but Not
Ready for Cyberattack, BLOOMBERG BNA: HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.bna.com/healthcare-industry-spending-n57982063383.
40.
Health Care Systems and Medical Devices at Risk for Increased Cyber
Intrusions for Financial Gain, supra note 35.
41.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 44, 46, 61.
42.
Id. at 3, 61.
43.
See id. at 36, 70; infra Part II.B.
44.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
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room and have been on the market for years.45 The cell phone in your pocket
likely has more cybersecurity protection than an infusion pump, a critically
important medical device.46 Medical devices will never be completely
secure from cybersecurity vulnerabilities.47
However, many of the
vulnerabilities that affect medical devices are self-inflicted by design.48 The
devices themselves do not deserve all of the blame, as healthcare
organizations often do not consistently report security issues to the FDA
reporting program.49
A.

Hard-Coded Passwords

The majority of infusion pumps have both maintenance usernames,
which allow for technical support, and passwords that are hard-coded.50 In
2013, the DHS issued an alert stating that over 300 medical devices from
forty different vendors contained hard-coded passwords that could be
exploited in order to change critical settings in the device.51 A hard-coded
password is exactly what it sounds like, a password for the device that is
programmed by the manufacturer and cannot be changed.52 Devices affected
included infusion pumps, ventilators, patient monitors, and surgical devices,
among many others.53 The dilemma facing medical device manufacturers
that choose hard-coded passwords for their devices is a complicated one to
reconcile.54 A hard-coded password allows manufacturers to troubleshoot
45.
See HEALTHCARE TECH. SAFETY INST., AAMI FOUND., SAFETY
INNOVATIONS: BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFUSION PUMP-INFORMATION
NETWORK INTEGRATION 3–4 (2012); Hagen, supra note 4, at 25.
46.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36, 61.
47.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
48.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 48.
49.
Russell L. Jones, Networked Medical Device Cybersecurity and Patient
Safety: Thoughts on Collaborative Approaches, DELOITTE: DCHS (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM),
http://www.deloitte.typepad.com/centerforhealthsolutions/2013/10/networked-medicaldevice-cybersecurity-and-patient-safety-time-to-step-up-to-the-plate.html#.
50.
See GAVIN O’BRIEN, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., WIRELESS
MEDICAL INFUSION PUMPS 3–4 (2015); INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note
30, at 33, 70; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
51.
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
52.
JASON HEALEY ET AL., THE HEALTHCARE INTERNET OF THINGS: REWARDS
AND RISKS 14 (2015); see also INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at
33–34, 70; O’BRIEN, supra note 50, at 2; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords,
supra note 3.
53.
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; see also
O’BRIEN, supra note 50 at 2–3.
54.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TECH., supra note 30, at 35, 70–74; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra
note 3.
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any problems with the device remotely because, generally, only the device
manufacturer can provide technical support and fixes to a malfunctioning
device.55
Hard-coded passwords also allow medical personnel access to the
device in case of an emergency.56 For example, if a person with an
embedded pacemaker collapses while on vacation, a hard-coded password
allows medical personnel to quickly render assistance because they can look
up the password for the device quickly.57 The downside is that anyone can
obtain the password to that device with a little bit of effort and a Google
search.58 When medical personnel leave the hospital, there is an inability to
revoke the access to the device of the former employee. 59 The most
distressing issue with hard-coded passwords is that an attacker can breach a
device and actively be in a healthcare organization’s network for months
without detection.60 The use of hard-coded passwords may be the easiest
cybersecurity challenge to fix for manufacturers in the future, as all that
would be needed is to not deploy devices with hard-coded passwords.
B.

Outdated Software and Operating Systems

The FDA’s alert regarding the Hospira’s Infusion System shows the
challenges of securing medical devices that have been in the market for years
from attackers.61 The pump was over ten years old at the time of the alert but

55.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36–37; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
56.
HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; see also INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 36–37; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
57.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14.
58.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 73; Alert:
Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3.
59.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3–4.
60.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; INST. FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3, 70, 73–74; Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded
Passwords, supra note 3.
61.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) No. K042081, PLUM A+ INFUSION
SYSTEM WITH HOSPIRA MEDNET SOFTWARE AND PLUM A+3 INFUSION SYSTEM WITH HOSPIRA
MEDNET SOFTWARE (2004), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf4/K042081.pdf;
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
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still widely in use.62 It was also in the process of being phased out for a
newer model for reasons not related to cybersecurity.63 It is likely that the
pump was using an unsupported operating system that was no longer being
updated or patched to address vulnerabilities.64 The device had a staggering
amount of vulnerabilities, the worst of which was that the pump could be
accessed remotely and “allow . . . unauthorized user[s] to control the
device.”65 The Hospira Infusion System case appears to be a common issue
for medical devices.66 Many medical devices are “running out of date . . .
operating systems such as Windows 2000, Windows XP, or Linux.”67 These
operating systems are patched less often than other connected systems.68
Many manufacturers believe that changes to a device, including patches to
address vulnerabilities, would require them to obtain re-approval from the
FDA so they do not update and patch them.69 The FDA guidance documents
actually state that this common misconception, held by manufacturers about
patching vulnerabilities, is not the case.70 Even so, patching or updating a
medical device to address vulnerabilities takes time.71 Time is not a luxury if
there is a severely dangerous vulnerability in a medical device, and if a
medical device is surgically implanted, patching firmware or software may

62.
See 510(k) No. K042081, supra note 61; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of
Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; Vulnerabilities
of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication,
supra note 5.
63.
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA
Safety Communication, supra note 5.
64.
See id.
65.
Id.; see also Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion
Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5.
66.
See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 73;
Alert: Medical Devices Hard-Coded Passwords, supra note 3; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5;
Vulnerabilities of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
67.
TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 10.
68.
See id.
69.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9–
10.
70.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 11.
71.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9.
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not be practical or feasible.72 The fix is to disconnect the device from the
network, but this defeats the purpose of having networked medical devices.73
C.

Lack of Malware Scanning

The most serious cybersecurity threat to medical devices is
malware.74 As stated previously, the motivation for the majority of attacks
on medical devices is financial, and the primary way an attacker obtains
profitable information is through the deployment of malware.75 A laptop,
home computer, and a cellphone have the option to download a program that
scans for malware that may be infecting those devices.76 Many medical
devices come without antivirus or malware protection, basic encryption, or
vulnerability lifecycle management.77 Even if there is malware scanning
capabilities in a medical device, medical devices are generally unable to
perform these scans because most are in use twenty-four hours a day, 365
days out of the year.78 They are also closed systems, not open for installation
of any third party software that could scan for viruses or malware.79 If
scanning software can be installed, it may void the warranty of the device.80
This means that unless a device has a malware or virus scanner built in, there
would be no way to determine that the medical devices are infected until it is
much too late.81 “Finally, even when sophisticated attacks are detected, it is
still very difficult to remove the malware and blunt the attack without the full
cooperation of the medical device manufacturer.”82

72.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 14; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of
Hospira Symbiq Infusion System: FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; Vulnerabilities
of Hospira LifeCare PCA3 and PCA5 Infusion Pump Systems: FDA Safety Communication,
supra note 5.
73.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 13; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
35; Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbriq Infusion System: FDA Safety
Communication, supra note 5.
74.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 12.
75.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 5–6; Alert: Ransomware and Recent
Variants, supra note 1.
76.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 13–14; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
10; Alert: Ransomware and Recent Variants, supra note 1.
77.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 9, 16, 37–38.
78.
Id. at 9–10, 35.
79.
Id. at 35.
80.
See id. at 10–11.
81.
See HEALEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 16; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 11.
82.
TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 35.
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FDA POSTMARKET GUIDANCE OVERVIEW

The FDA faces the challenge of promoting safe and secure medical
devices while trying not to stifle innovation by issuing restrictive and
burdensome regulations.83 Through the use of guidance documents, the FDA
tries to recommend the best possible practices for manufacturers to protect
patient safety.84 The guidance promotes a risk management process for
manufacturers to address cybersecurity.85 It also reiterates that cybersecurity
is a shared responsibility among stakeholders.86 Device manufacturers,
vendors, information technology professionals, health information
technology developers, and the users of medical devices are the stakeholders
responsible for cybersecurity.87 Stakeholders are numerous and varied, but
the FDA only regulates manufacturers of medical devices, which makes
cybersecurity even more difficult.88 That is why the main goal of the FDA’s
cybersecurity approach is collaboration between stakeholders, because an
effective cybersecurity program is only as good as the weakest link.89 Often,
this weakest link changes depending on the threat.90 For example, a device
that is perfectly secure from outside attackers may still end up being
compromised and affect patient safety because the patients themselves
tampered with the device, or a hospital employee infects a hospital network
because they clicked on a link contained in a suspicious email.91 What can
the FDA do when a user of a medical device does not follow good
cybersecurity practices and infects an entire network, putting patient safety at
risk? The guidance attempts to achieve this goal of collaboration between
stakeholders by issuing recommendations to manufacturers that help mitigate
the various threats to medical devices.92

83.
See id. at 6, 9–10.
84.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; see also TRAPX LABS, supra
note 2, at 9–10.
85.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at
9–10. “Th[e] [G]uidance applies to: (1) medical devices that contain software, including
firmware, or programmable logic, and (2) software that is a medical device.” U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
86.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
87.
Id.; see also TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 35.
88.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
89.
See id.; TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 12.
90.
See TRAPX LABS, supra note 2, at 12.
91.
See id. at 9.
92.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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Defining Essential Clinical Performance

The inability to be completely secure from threats is a common
statement made by the FDA, as it has appeared in nearly every cybersecurity
related communication released by the agency.93 The FDA introduces the
term essential clinical performance as a way to compensate for the reality
that a device will never be free of vulnerabilities.94 Essential clinical
performance is thus used to gauge whether a vulnerability in a device would
trigger safety concerns for patients.95 When a vulnerability compromises the
essential clinical performance of a device, there is a situation where that
vulnerability could result in severe injury or death in a patient.96 In that
event, manufacturers would be required to intervene and remedy that
vulnerability as soon as possible to prevent those situations from occurring.97
Manufacturers are directed to define the essential clinical performance of
their device, the outcomes in terms of severity if compromised, and the level
of risk that is acceptable.98 Vulnerabilities that do not have an impact on the
essential clinical performance are supposed to be assessed in case those
vulnerabilities do impact the essential clinical performance of the device in
the future.99 Essentially, the FDA is telling manufacturers to triage
cybersecurity of their devices.100
Manufacturers are recommended to assess the cybersecurity risk to
their device by considering the exploitability of the vulnerability and the
severity of the health impact to patients if the vulnerability were to be
exploited.101 Manufacturers are given latitude in how they assess these two
considerations as long as it is industry accepted.102 The FDA does
recommend using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, Version 3.0,
to assess exploitability and ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971: 2007/(R)2010:
Medical Devices—Application of Risk Management to Medical Devices to
assess severity of the health impact to patients.103
93.
Id.
94.
Id. Essential clinical performance is defined as “performance that is
necessary to achieve freedom from unacceptable clinical risk.” Id.
95.
Id.
96.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. “The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (“CVSS”) is an open
framework for communicating the characteristics and severity of software vulnerabilities.”
FORUM OF INCIDENT RESPONSE & SEC. TEAMS, COMMON VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM
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Controlled and Uncontrolled Risks

The FDA states that manufacturers determine if risks to essential
clinical performance are acceptable or unacceptable.104 Here, the guidance
documents again introduce new terms: those that are controlled and
uncontrolled.105 If a risk is acceptable, it is labeled controlled, and
unacceptable risks are labeled uncontrolled.106 Again, acceptable risks do
not impact patient safety.107 Controlled risks do not affect a medical device’s
essential clinical performance, meaning that there is no impact on patient
safety.108 Here, the guidance issues its most important statement.109 Any
change made to the medical device to address a controlled risk is considered
a device enhancement.110 This means that a manufacturer deploying a patch
or update of the device would not have to report it to the FDA.111 This is
welcomed news, as manufacturers are free to update and patch their devices
without worry that their medical devices will need to be reapproved by the
FDA because of changes or updates.112
An uncontrolled risk contains an unacceptable risk to the essential
clinical performance of the device.113 Patient safety is threatened with the
presence of an uncontrolled risk, and control of the medical device could be
compromised.114 Manufacturers are recommended to remedy these risks as
quickly as possible, or to at least reduce the risk to an acceptable level.115
All uncontrolled risks to essential clinical performance are required to be
reported to the FDA according to Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations
part 806.116 Interestingly, the FDA will not enforce reporting requirements if
“[t]here are no known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the
vulnerability.”117 This intent not to enforce the reporting requirements
comes with the caveat that “[w]ithin [thirty] days of learning of the
V3.0:

SPECIFICATION DOCUMENT 1 (2015), http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-v30-specificationv1.7.pdf.
104.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
See id.
108.
See id.
109.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
110.
Id.
111.
See 21 C.F.R. § 806.1(b)(1) (2016); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 11.
112.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
21 C.F.R. § 806.1; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
117.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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vulnerability, the manufacturer identifies and implements device changes . . .
or compensating controls to bring the . . . risk to an acceptable level.”118
Manufacturers must also notify users and be a participant in an ISAO to
avoid reporting requirements.119 If a manufacturer cannot remedy the
uncontrolled risk, the FDA would then consider that there is a reasonable
probability that the device will cause serious injury or death, and the device
would then “be considered [to be] in violation of the [Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic] Act . . . subject[ing it] to enforcement or other action.”120
C.

Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations

The guidance documents state that the sharing of risk information
and intelligence within the medical device community is of critical
importance in the adoption of a risk-based approach to cybersecurity, and
ISAOs fulfill that critically important role.121 These ISAOs are intended to
serve as focal points for information and collaboration of cybersecurity
issues between the private sector and government.122 The stated purpose of
an ISAO is to develop a shared understanding of risks to medical devices so
stakeholders can efficiently assess patient health risks.123 Participation in an
ISAO is voluntary for manufacturers; however, the FDA considers
participation a critical component of an effective cybersecurity risk
management program.124
The guidance stresses the importance of
participation by calling it “a significant step toward assuring the . . . safety
and effectiveness of . . . medical devices.”125 The FDA further incentivizes
participation by indicating that it “does not intend to enforce certain
reporting requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”126
Participation in an ISAO and following the other recommendations in the
guidance are prerequisites to the FDA using discretion in enforcement of
reporting requirements.127
ISAOs are intended by the FDA to include groups from any sector,
not just healthcare, and participation is inclusive and open to any that wish to
join.128 The FDA states that ISAOs would also allow participating members
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
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to receive “[a]ctionable . . . useful, and practical cybersecurity [information] .
. . and incident information [through] automated, real-time mechanisms,”
although it does not elaborate on how that will be accomplished.129 The
FDA envisions ISAOs as transparent in terms of providing information to
potential members on how the ISAO operates because they are intended to
be trusted.130 The information shared will be safeguarded to preserve
business confidentiality.131 “[P]articipants in an ISAO can request that . . .
information [provided] be treated as Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information.”132 This “information is shielded from any release otherwise
required by the Freedom of Information Act or State Sunshine Laws and is
[also] exempt from regulatory . . . and civil litigation” use.133
IV.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FDA GUIDANCE

The guidance can essentially be broken down into two components,
both of which fall short of addressing the severe cybersecurity challenges
facing medical devices.134 The FDA recommends that manufacturers adopt
risk management programs consistent with, and incorporating elements of,
the “[National Institute of Standards and Technology] Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”135 The basic elements of
which are “[i]dentify, [p]rotect, [d]etect, [r]espond, and [r]ecover.”136 The
framework is risk based, designed to manage risk, and intended to
complement an organization’s already existing cybersecurity program.137
The framework is a good recommendation, however, it should be tailored to
fit the healthcare industry, as the framework is not industry specific and is
intended to complement existing cybersecurity management programs. 138
Where the recommendations in the guidance fall short is incorporating the
newly introduced “essential clinical performance” and “controlled and
uncontrolled risk” into the risk management process.139 The second
component that is problematic is the pressure to join “information sharing
and analysis organizations” without providing any detail on how they will

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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Id.
Id.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
Id.; see also Hagen, supra note 4, at 34–35.
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operate, what information will be available, and how information shared will
be protected.140
A.

Patient Privacy v. Patient Safety

The guidance, as written, fails to address privacy concerns because
the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled risk will allow
manufacturers to ignore cybersecurity vulnerabilities that impact patient
privacy.141 Essential clinical performance is directly tied only to patient
safety concerns, implying that any vulnerability that will not result in injury
or death could be ignored.142 Manufacturers are free to address any
vulnerability that does not impact safety at their leisure.143 The manufacturer
could also ignore the vulnerability altogether, since there are usually no
consequences for the manufacturer when a healthcare organization has a
breach and patient health information is stolen.144 The guidance documents
do not address any patient privacy concerns and reinforce a view that privacy
is not a cybersecurity priority for the FDA.145 Granted, the FDA’s primary
purpose is to ensure medical devices are safe for patients above anything
else.146 The focus on safety is understandable, as a device that can seriously
injure or even kill a patient is much more harmful than a device that has
stolen the personal and financial information of perhaps every patient in a
given healthcare organization.147 What is not considered is that the loss of
patient privacy can also result in harm to a person’s reputation, economic
situation, and mental health.148 Although patient information is covered by
laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), manufacturers are not usually subject to that law.149

140.
See id.
141.
See id.; Comment Letter from American Association for Justice,
Comment Letter on Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, (Apr. 21,
2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-D-5105-0031.
142.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
143.
See id.; Hagen, supra note 4, at 28.
144.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
145.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
146.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 10, at 47.
147.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 26.
148.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 8–9.
149.
See Hagen, supra note 4, at 30; When May a Covered Health Care
Provider Disclose Protected Health Information, Without an Authorization or Business
Associate Agreement, to a Medical Device Company Representative?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/490/when-may-

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/6

16

Kersbergen: Patient Safety Should Include Patient Privacy: The Shortcomings O

2017]

SHORTCOMINGS OF FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE

413

HIPAA regulates either covered entities, which consist of healthcare
providers or health plans, and business associates, which can be entities that
either “create[], receive[], maintain[], or transmit[] [patient] health
information” or perform other services on behalf of a covered entity that
involve the disclosure of patient health information.150 A medical device
manufacturer would generally not be considered a covered entity, but a
medical device manufacturer is subject to HIPAA if they are business
associates of a covered entity.151 While this means that medical device
manufacturers must comply with HIPAA as business associates,
manufacturers can avoid business associate classification altogether by
ensuring that they merely sell or provide software or equipment to a covered
entity and the manufacturer does not have access to the patient health
information.152 Even when there is a situation where patient health
information may need to be accessed by the manufacturer, the manufacturer
could avoid having to comply with HIPAA by ensuring the health
information is not personally identifiable.153 In these cases, a medical device
manufacturer is not subjected to any regulation that protects patient
privacy.154
The College of Healthcare Information Management Executives
(“CHIME”) and the Association for Executives in Healthcare Information
Security (“AEHIS”), in their public comment to the FDA’s guidance,
proposed a solution for addressing the patient privacy shortcomings of the
guidance.155 They suggested inserting patient safety and patient information
subcategories under both controlled and uncontrolled risk.156 This would
ensure that uncontrolled vulnerabilities that do not cause any patient safety
issues, and as such do not affect essential clinical performance, are still
addressed, and any harm to patients and healthcare organizations is

a-covered-health-care-provider-disclose-protected-health-information-withoutauthorization/index.html.
150.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103(4)(1)(i) (2013).
151.
Id. § 160.103(4)(3)(i).
152.
Public Welfare, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5571 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 160).
153.
Id. at 5574.
154.
See id.; When May a Covered Health Care Provider Disclose Protected
Health Information, Without an Authorization or Business Associate Agreement, to a Medical
Device Company Representative?, supra note 149.
155.
Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, Comment Letter on Postmarket
Management
of
Cybersecurity
in
Medical
Devices
(Apr.
21,
2016),
http://chimecentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CHIME-AEHIS-Letter-to-FDA-onDevice-Cyber.pdf.
156.
Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
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minimized.157 The guidance as it is written now would potentially allow an
attacker to access a networked medical device with a controlled
vulnerability, and then once inside a healthcare organization’s network,
pivot, and potentially access other devices and subsequently impact patient
safety by exploiting vulnerabilities in other devices.158 Attackers are
overwhelmingly focused on, and targeting, patient data.159
The
disproportionate focus by the FDA on patient safety, when there has not been
an event where a patient has been harmed, may send the message to those
intent on stealing information that cybersecurity in devices that do have
vulnerabilities that impact safety is weak.160 The perception of weak security
is already driving motivations to attack, and the guidance setting aside
privacy concerns could lead to a greater numbers of attacks.161
B.

ISAO Poorly Defined and Full of Risk

The guidance suggestion that manufacturers join an ISAO is
problematic because the language implies any group or individual can join an
ISAO and have access to the information being shared about
vulnerabilities.162 Indeed, the guidance specifically states that membership is
inclusive for anyone and everyone that wishes to join.163 The assumption
from the language indicates that information shared with the ISAO would be
publicly available, meaning good intentioned members will be participants in
ISAOs with members that do not have good intentions.164 Hackers and other
opportunists looking for information on exploitable vulnerabilities will no
doubt be members of those very same ISAOs as well.165
In August 2016, MedSec, a startup cybersecurity firm based in
Florida, provided an example of just how badly information-sharing of

157.
Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155; see also U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
158.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; HEALEY ET AL., supra note
52, at 11; INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 10; Hagen, supra note
4, at 25.
159.
INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., supra note 30, at 3–4.
160.
See id.; Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155.
161.
See Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note 155; U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
162.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
163.
Id.
164.
See id.
165.
See Clarke, supra note 29; Comment from CHIME & AEHIS, supra note
155.
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cybersecurity vulnerabilities can go.166 The firm discovered alleged security
flaws in pacemakers made by St. Jude Medical, a medical device
manufacturer.167
Rather than offer to sell the information to the
manufacturer, or report the information to the FDA like some researchers do,
they sold the information to Muddy Waters, an investment research firm. 168
Muddy Waters promptly announced it was shorting St. Jude stock based on
the information.169 Based on the reported vulnerabilities, the FDA and the
DHS also announced they were investigating the manufacturer’s device.170
The fees for MedSec were predicated on how well Muddy Waters’ short
position did.171 If the stock tanked, which it did, the fee would be higher.172
St. Jude vigorously denied the allegations and cybersecurity researchers have
panned the report released by MedSec as flawed.173 The damage had already
been done though. Not only are medical devices exploitable, so too is the
information about vulnerabilities affecting those devices.174
The guidance documents are silent on any statutory, or regulatory,
protections members of ISAOs would receive.175 While information-sharing
is important, the value of information diminishes if it is not actionable, or, if
there are large amounts of information.176 The guidance documents require
manufacturers to report all uncontrolled vulnerabilities, even those that do
not affect patient safety, possibly flooding ISAOs with information on
vulnerabilities, many of them harmless.177 Worse, some vital information
may be excluded based on the different regulatory environments of the
varied stakeholders.178 Whether healthcare delivery organizations could
166.
See Elaine Ou, Hacking a Company’s Stock Price, BLOOMBERG: VIEW
(Sept. 12, 2016, 10:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-12/hacking-acompany-s-stock-price.
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
Jim Finkle, U.S. Health Regulator Plans ‘Thorough’ Probe of St. Jude
Case, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-st-jude-medicalcyber-fda-idUSKCN11E32Y.
171.
Ou, supra note 166.
172.
See id.; Aaron Pressman, Hacking Report on St. Jude Pacemakers Was
Flawed,
Researchers
Say,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
31,
2016,
9:02
AM),
http://www.fortune.com/2016/08/31/hacking-st-jude-pacemakers-flawed/.
173.
Ou, supra note 166; Pressman, supra note 172.
174.
See Finkle, supra note 170.
175.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
176.
See id.
177.
Id.
178.
Comment from Rapid7, Comments to FDA’s Draft Guidance for
Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.rapid7.com/globalassets/_pdfs/rapid7-comments/rapid7-comments-to-fda-draft-
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potentially violate a regulation or law, such as HIPAA, by providing
information regarding a vulnerability to an ISAO that puts patient
information at risk, is a question that should be addressed by the guidance
documents.179
Without any detailed criteria about how these organizations work,
the governance process, or safeguards of information, it is unlikely that
manufacturers would join even though participation is greatly
incentivized.180 The FDA also includes a red herring regarding the incentive
to manufacturers to join an ISAO.181 Medical device manufacturers would
not be required to report uncontrolled cybersecurity vulnerabilities under
Title 21, section 806 of the Code of Federal Regulation if certain
requirements are met.182 The most important requirement is that there are no
known serious adverse events or deaths associated with the vulnerability.183
As previously stated, that means the guidance obligates manufacturers to
report to an ISAO all uncontrolled vulnerabilities, increasing the burden on
manufacturers that right now do not have to report those vulnerabilities.184
C.

Recommendations Not Requirements

Obligating manufacturers to report based on what is written in the
guidance is a misnomer, as nothing in the guidance requires manufacturers to
do anything different than what they are doing now.185 The guidance is
inadequate because it is not enforceable and does not hold manufacturers
“responsible for unsecured or defective [cybersecurity of] medical
devices.”186
Cybersecurity threats and attacks are getting worse.187
Healthcare organizations are being subjected to ransomware attacks,

guidance-for-postmarket-management-of-cybersecurity-in-medical-devices---docket-no.-fda2015-d-5105---apr.-19-2016.pdf.
179.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
180.
See id.; Comment from Fresenius Kabi, Comment Letter on FDA Draft
Guidance on Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2015-D-51050038&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
181.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment from Fresenius
Kabi, supra note 180.
182.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; Comment Letter from
American Association for Justice, supra note 141; see also 21 C.F.R. § 806.1(b) (2016).
183.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
184.
See id.; Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra
note 141.
185.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
186.
Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note 141.
187.
Comment from Fresenius Kabi, supra note 180.
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intrusions that steal patient data from millions of people.188 An attacker
using a pacemaker to kill a patient has gone from being a once clever plot in
Hollywood fiction to something that is only a matter of time from happening.
The guidance is non-binding on every stakeholder to which it applies.189 The
guidance urges collaboration, risk sharing, and risk management.190 Lofty
outcomes can only be accomplished by making the recommendations in the
guidance requirements.191 Nothing in the guidance places an undue burden
on manufacturers of medical devices; it merely calls for cybersecurity risks
to be effectively managed through a risk management program.192 The FDA
has been providing guidance to the medical device manufacturer community
for nearly two decades related to cybersecurity.193 Medical devices continue
to be delivered to the market with either unsupported operating systems, no
software maintenance plans in place, or a host of other vulnerabilities.194
The FDA must go from making recommendations that manufacturers should
follow to making standardized requirements if it wants to seriously protect
patient safety and privacy.195
V.

CONCLUSION

The FDA guidance as discussed is merely a draft.196 However, based
on the generally positive reception by the medical device industry, it is very
likely that the draft will be adopted unchanged in the final guidance
document.197 The guidance proposes effective risk management ideas that
should already be in use by manufacturers to prevent attackers exploiting
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.198 Attempting to protect, or anticipate and
remedy every vulnerability a medical device may have now or in the future is
unrealistic. A risk based approach allows manufacturers to adapt to threats
that tend to adapt quicker than those tasked with guarding against them.199
The guidance is a step in the right direction but should be faulted for the lack
188.
Id.
189.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; see also Comment from
Rapid7, supra note 178.
190.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
191.
See Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
192.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
193.
See id.; Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
194.
See Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities of Hospira Symbiq Infusion System:
FDA Safety Communication, supra note 5; supra Section II.B.
195.
See Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
196.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11.
197.
See Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note
141; Comment from Fresenius Kabi, supra note 180; Comment from Rapid7, supra note 178.
198.
See supra Section IV.A.
199.
See supra Section IV.
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of privacy considerations.200 Patient health should be a priority alongside
patient safety.201 Essential clinical performance should include patient
privacy.202 Furthermore, the guidance suggests that ISAOs are critical to
effective medical device cybersecurity, yet spends very little time fleshing
out their vision on how exactly they will work and reassuring manufacturers
that information about cybersecurity vulnerabilities will not be exploited by
opportunists.203 Finally, recommendations should turn into requirements.204
Nothing in the guidance as proposed places an undue burden on
manufacturers, nor does it stifle innovation.205 The FDA has a track record
of issuing guidance that is ignored by those towards whom the
recommendations are directed.206

141.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 11; supra Section IV.C.
See Comment Letter from American Association for Justice, supra note
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